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1. Introduction
In this paper we introduce a novel approach of viewing a simple game by its its
dimension or codimension according to the minimal dimensional class of simple
games or respectively minimal codimensional class of simple games. We introduce
and study the properties of these notions. We show how they can be referred to as
a basis or dual basis for the class of simple games. We also provide a completeness
in the sense that any simple game can be measured in this terms, ie. any simple
game has a dimension and codimension, as deﬁned in this paper. We also describe
many important corollaries, following from these results, and we give some practical
interpretations of these notions. In particular we show the relations of these notions
to the winning and losing coalitions of the game - more precisely to the set ofminimal
winning coalitions and maximal loosing coalitions, or minimal blocking coalitions in
the game.
To recall a classical concept of dimension we refer to the class of weighted sim-
ple games which are probably the most important subclass of simple games. It
is well known that every simple game can be represented as an intersection of
weighted games. It nevertheless becomes of interest to ask how eﬃciently this can
be done for a given simple game. The concept of dimension known in the literature
is based on the fact that each simple game can be expressed as a ﬁnite intersection
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of weighted simple games, (Taylor and Zwicker, 1993), (Taylor and Zwicker, 1995),
(Taylor and Zwicker, 1999). The question of eﬃciency leads to the deﬁnition of the
classical dimension. A simple game is said to be of dimension k if and only if it
can be represented as the intersection of exactly k weighted games, but not as the
intersection of k − 1 weighted games. In this sense, we can regard weighted simple
games as a generating system of the class of simple games with the intersection as
the basic operation. There exist several real–world examples of voting systems in
use today where laws are passed by a method known as ‘count and account,’ which
are examples of dimension 1 or 2. For analysis and some examples on this voting
system, we refer the reader to (Peleg, 1992) and (Carreras and Freixas, 2004).
The deﬁnition of dimension was introduced for graphs in the late 1970s; its
extension to hypergraphs (simple games not necessarily monotonic) is due to Jeres-
low (Jereslow, 1975). Nevertheless, this notion for simple games is reminiscent of the
dimension (Dushnik and Miller (Dushnik and Miller, 1941)) of a partially ordered
set, which was deﬁned as the minimum number of linear orders whose intersection
is the given partial ordering. In the present paper we restrict the contents to simple
games, disregarding the possibility of abstention or absence.
The ﬁrst goal of this paper consists in extending the concept of dimension,
originally deﬁned for weighted games, to other subclasses of simple games, and in
particular ﬁnding a ’basic’ subclass of simple games for which the associated notion
of dimension exists. We show in this paper that, in fact, such a smallest class exists
and we show its uniqueness as well. We show the same for the dual case, i.e. of the
codimension.
The notion of a codimension which we introduce gives the completeness to this
theory, and provides us with the tools of studding the dual cases. We answer a
natural question which arises in this context – whether it is feasible to get an
analogous concept of dimension, namely codimension, by using the union instead of
the intersection as the basic operation. Indeed, we show that the codimension is well
deﬁned for several subclasses of simple games. Moreover, we show that there exists
a unique smallest subclass of simple games for which the associated codimension
exists.
The results presented here emphasize the extent to which the study of the dimen-
sion constitutes a bridge between the theory of simple games and hypergraphs and
other theories like Reliability and Circuits Theory see, for example, Ramamurthy,
1990 or (Freixas and Puente, 2001).
The paper is organized as follows. After a section on preliminaries, revising the
terminology and recalling some signiﬁcant results on classical dimension of simple
games, we extend in Section 3 the concept of dimension to several classes of simple
games and introduce the notion of codimension of a simple game. Section 4 contains
some results on dimension and codimension and establishes a relationship between
the two notions. Section 5 shows the existence and uniqueness of subclasses of simple
games being (co)dimensionally minimum. Some computational aspects of dimension
and codimension are provided in Section 6. Concluding remarks are provided in
Section 7.
2. Preliminaries
To revise and establish notations we recall the important deﬁnitions.
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A simple game is a pair (N,W ) where N = {1, 2, ..., n} and W is an arbitrary
collection of subsets of N . The simple game is monotonic if, moreover, S ∈ W and
S ⊆ T , then T ∈ W . From now on we only deal with monotonic simple games with
the two additional assumptions ∅ /∈ W and N ∈W .
Simple games can be viewed as models of voting systems in which a single
alternative, such as a bill or an amendment, is pitted against the status quo. The
set N is called the grand coalition, its members are called players or voters, and
the sets in W are called winning coalitions. The intuition here is that a set S is a
winning coalition if and only if the bill or amendment passes when the players in
S are precisely the ones who voted for it. A subset of N that is not in W is called a
losing coalition and the collection of losing coalitions is denoted by L. If each proper
subcoalition of a winning coalition is losing, this winning coalition is called minimal.
The set of minimal winning coalitions is denoted by Wm. It should be noted that
a simple game is completely determined by its minimal winning coalitions. If each
proper supra-coalition of a losing coalition is winning, this losing coalition is called
maximal. The set of maximal losing coalitions is denoted by LM . A player i ∈ N
null in (N,W ) if i /∈ S for every S ∈Wm. A player i ∈ N is a winner if {i} ∈ W. A
simple game (N,W ) is proper if S ∈ W implies N \ S ∈ L. A simple game (N,W )
is strong if S ∈ L implies N \ S ∈ W . If D is a ﬁnite set, then |D| denotes the
cardinality of D.
A simple game (N,W ) is called a weighted game if it admits a representation
by means of the n+1 non-negative real numbers [q;w1, ..., wn] such that S ∈ W iﬀ
w(S) ≥ q, where for each coalition S ⊆ N , w(S) = ∑
i∈S
wi. The number q is called
the quota of the game and wi the weight of player i. A k–out–of–n game is a simple
game where the minimal winning coalitions are those with k members. It is obvious
that k–out–of–n game is weighted and admits the representation [k; 1, . . . , 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
n
].
Two simple games (N,W ) and (N ′,W ′) are said to be isomorphic if there exists
a bijective map f : N → N ′ such that S ∈W iﬀ f(S) ∈ W ′.
Let (N,W ) be a simple game. Set W i = {S ∈ W : i ∈ S} and let τij : N → N
denote the transposition of players i, j ∈ N (i.e., τij(i) = j, τij(j) = i and τij(k) = k
for k = i and k = j). The individual desirability relation considered in (Isbell, 1956)
and (Isbell, 1958)) and later on generalized in (Maschler and Peleg, 1966), is the
binary relation  on N :
i  j iﬀ τij(W j) ⊆W i,
and say that i is at least as desirable as j as a coalition partner. It is easy to see
that  is a preorder, and the lack of antisymmetry is then solved by introducing
the associated equivalence relation ≈ the indiﬀerent part of the desirability relation
which is deﬁned by
i ≈ j iﬀ i  j and j  i;
hence i ≈ j means that i and j are equi-desirable as coalitional partners. The other
basic problem with desirability is that it is not always complete (total). Then, if
any two players are comparable by , (N,W ) is said to be a complete simple game
(complete games are also known in the literature of simple games as linear, directed
or ordered games); in this case the ≈–classes are linearly ordered. Note that each
weighted game is complete because wi ≥ wj implies i  j.
70 Josep Freixas and Dorota Marciniak
2.1. Preliminaries on the classical dimension
Revising the results and possible motivations related to the concept of the classical
dimension, we ﬁnd that in the literature only one concept of dimension has been
proposed, and as far as we know only this notion of dimension has been considered in
the theory of simple games. Following (Taylor and Zwicker, 1999), a simple game W
is said to be of dimension k if it can be represented as the intersection of k weighted
games, but cannot be represented as the intersection of k − 1 weighted games.
Equivalently, the dimension of W is the least k such that there exists weighted
simple games W1, . . . ,Wk such that
W = W1 ∩ · · · ∩Wk.
The possible motivation to introduce this concept of dimension has been based
on the observation that most naturally occurring, real–life voting systems in use
are of small dimension. As an example we can consider, the Electoral College of the
United States, which is a weighted game and hence has dimension 1. Another ex-
ample is the United Nations Security Council which has dimension 1 (for weighted
a representation see (Taylor, 1995) and (Taylor and Zwicker, 1999) taking into ac-
count the possibility of abstention). Interesting examples of dimension 2 are the
United States federal system, also the procedure for amending the Canadian Consti-
tution (see (Taylor, 1995), (Kilgour, 1983) and (Levesque and Kilgour, 1984)) and
the current European Union Council of Ministers for motions not coming from the
European Commission. Two conspicuous examples of dimension 3 can be found in
the Union Council of Ministers after the enlargement to 27 members agreed in Nice
in December 2000, (Freixas, 2004). We do not know about the existence of some
real-world voting system with dimension greater than 3. Whenever the dimension of
a simple game is not a huge number an eﬃcient decomposition of the simple game
as intersection of weighted games can be used to compute power indices with gen-
erating functions as was illustrated in (Algaba et.al., 2001) for the Banzhaf power
index for the European Union after the enlargement to 27 countries.
In De˘ıneko and Woeginger (De˘ıneko and Woeginger, 2006) it is proven that the
following problem ‘Given k weighted games, decide whether the dimension of their
intersection exactly equals k’ is NP-hard and hence computationally intractable,
thus their result indicates that the computation of the dimension of simple games
is a combinatorially complicated concept.
An important property of the concept of dimension is that:
Theorem 1 (Theorem 1.7.2, (Taylor and Zwicker, 1999)). Every simple game
has a ﬁnite dimension.
The proof in (Taylor and Zwicker, 1999) of Theorem 1 uses the following argu-
ment (further details on the proof are omitted here). For a simple game W on N ,
let LM = {T1, . . . , Tk}. Clearly, W = W1 ∩ · · · ∩ Wk where each Wi admits the
weighted representation [1;wi1, . . . , w
i
n] where
wij =
{
0, if j ∈ Ti;
1, otherwise.
Hence, W is the intersection of |LM | weighted games and, therefore it has dimension.
As a consequence of Theorem 1 the dimension of a simple game is bounded above
On the Notion of Dimension and Codimension of Simple Games 71
by the number of maximal losing coalitions. The following result shows that there
are games of every dimension.
Theorem 2 (Theorem 1.7.4, (Taylor and Zwicker, 1999)). For every m ≥ 1,
there is a simple game W of dimension m.
The proof in (Taylor and Zwicker, 1999) of Theorem 2 involves the following
game W of dimension m deﬁned on a set M (further details on the proof are
omitted here). Fix m ≥ 1 and let M = {1, . . . , 2m}. Let W be the collection of sets
deﬁned by
S ∈ W iﬀ S ∩ {2i− 1, 2i} = ∅ for i = 1, . . . ,m.
However, these games are highly ‘non-complete.’ Thus, one is left with the hope that
for games with high dimension, the complexity is caused by their non-completeness.
However, in (Freixas and Puente, 2008) it is proved that this conjecture is not true,
so that there exist complete games of every dimension. Exponential dimension is also
achieved for some simple games, see Theorem 1.7.5 in (Taylor and Zwicker, 1999)
and Theorem 1 in (Freixas and Puente, 2001) for games with a higher dimensional
behavior.
3. Dimension and codimension
3.1. Duality and basic subsets of simple games
To introduce a notion of dimension and codimension we recall the basic structures
related to a simple game. First we recall a notions of blocking coalitions and the
dual game.
Let S be the class of simple games on N . With every simple game W ∈ S, we can
associate a dual game W ∗ = {S ⊆ N : N \S /∈ W} whose elements are the blocking
coalitions in W , i.e., those that can prevent an issue from being passed. It is straight-
forward to check that the dual game is idempotent, i.e., W ∗∗ = W and satisﬁes the
two de Morgan’s laws (see, e.g. Proposition 1.4.3 in (Taylor and Zwicker, 1999)):
(W1 ∪W2)∗ = W ∗1 ∩W ∗2 ,
(W1 ∩W2)∗ = W ∗1 ∪W ∗2 . (1)
Let C ⊆ S be a subset of simple games on N , and let C∗ = {W ∗ ∈ S : W ∈ C}.
We say that C is closed under duality if C = C∗. Particularly, S is itself closed under
duality.
An example of a proper subset of S which is closed under duality is the class
of complete games, brieﬂy denoted L, because i  j in W ∈ L iﬀ i  j in W ∗ ∈
L. A proper subset of L which is closed under duality is the class of weighted
games, brieﬂy denoted M, because if W ∈ M admits [q;w1, . . . , wn] as a weighted
representation then [w−q+1;w1, . . . , wn] is a weighted representation for W ∗ ∈M
where w denotes hereafter the total sum of weights
n∑
i=1
wi.
A proper subset of M which is not closed under duality is the class of homoge-
neous games. Let H1 be the class of homogeneous games, i.e. W ∈ H1 if W admits a
representation [q;w1, . . . , wn] for which the weight of all minimal winning coalitions
equals the quota. Note that H1 is not closed under duality, but
∑
i∈S
wi = q for all
S ∈ Wm implies that the dual game, W ∗ ∈ S admits the weighted representation
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[w − q + 1;w1, . . . , wn] with w(T ) = w − q for all T ∈ (L∗)M . In words, the dual
of a homogeneous game is a game that admits a representation as a weighted game
wherein the weight of all maximal losing coalitions coincide. Let H2 denote that
class of games, then H1 = H2 and H1∗ = H2, and by idempotency H1 = H2∗. Of
course, the set H = H1 ∪ H2 is closed under duality, although neither H1 nor H2
are.
3.2. The class of unitary vs. unanimity games
In this subsection we recall the dual analogy between the classes of unitary and
unanimity games.
We say that a gameW is unitary if it admits a weighted representation [q;w1, . . . ,
wn] where q = 1, w ≥ 1, and wi is either 0 or 1 for all i = 1, . . . , n. If wi = 1 then
i is a winner in W , whereas wi = 0 implies that i is null in W . Equivalently, W is
unitary iﬀ Wm is uniquely formed by singletons (the winners of the game). Let U1
denote the class of unitary games then |U1| = 2n − 1.
The dual representation of a unitary game [1;w1, . . . , wn] is [w;w1, . . . , wn] which
is a weighted representation of the unanimity gameW of coalition {k ∈ N : wk = 1},
equivalently, Wm is formed by a single coalition whenever the game is unanimous.
Let U2 denote the class of unanimity games, then U1 = U2 and U1∗ = U2, and
by idempotency U1 = U2∗. Of course, the set U = U1 ∪ U2 is closed under duality,
although neither U1 nor U2 are. It is clear that |U2| = 2n−1 and |U| = 2n+1−(n+2).
3.3. New notions of dimension
Here we introduce the new concepts of dimension and codimension for simple games.
Let C  S be a proper subset of simple games on N , W ∈ S is said to be
of C-dimension k if it can be represented as the intersection of k games in C, but
cannot be represented as the intersection of k − 1 games in C. Equivalently, the
C-dimension of W is the least k such that there exists games W1, . . . ,Wk in C such
that
W = W1 ∩ · · · ∩Wk.
Brieﬂy, we will denote dimC(W ) = k. Notice that W ∈ C iﬀ dimC(W ) = 1.
W ∈ S is said to be of C-codimension k if it can be represented as the union of k
games in C, but cannot be represented as the union of k−1 games in C. Equivalently,
the C-codimension of W is the least k such that there exists games W1, . . . ,Wk in
C such that
W = W1 ∪ · · · ∪Wk.
Brieﬂy, we will denote codimC(W ) = k. The M-codimension is simply called codi-
mension.
3.4. Practical interpretation
The meaning in practice of the introduced notions is as follows. Let us consider the
new game “blocking the law to pass” for each of the games with dimension 2 or 3
mentioned in the Preliminaries. These games are the respectively the dual games
of the original ones e.g. (United States federal system, the procedure for amending
the Canadian Constitution or the current European Union Council of Ministers for
motions not coming from the European Commission), thus they decompose as union
of two or three weighted games (which are at the same time the duals of the weighted
games appearing in the original decomposition as intersection of them). As we shall
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see in Theorem 3-(ii) the dimension of a game coincides with the codimension of
its dual game. Thus, every real–world example of a voting system with dimension p
provides a real–world example of a voting system with codimension p and conversely.
Note that for each of the voting systems considered in the Preliminaries (with
dimension greater than 1), it is even easier to win in the blocking game (with
codimension greater than 1) than to win in the original one. This is motivated
since voting systems are usually demanded to be proper so that |W | ≤ 2n−1, which
implies that the dual game is strong and hence |W ∗| ≥ 2n−1.
A natural source of examples with small codimension but with exponential di-
mension (see (Freixas and Puente, 2001)) appears for a special type of compound
simple games considered by Shapley (Shapley, 1962). For compound games each
player belongs to one of m chambers. The bill is previously accepted or refused in
each one of the chambers and ﬁnally a rule of global decision (which includes all the
possible results for the chambers) is applied. A particular game of this type uses
unanimity in each one of the chambers, while the global decision is an individualist
game played by all the chambers. The resulting game is a composition of unanimity
games via individualism which models voting systems in which a lobby in a com-
mittee can impose its criteria to other lobbies whenever a full agreement of all its
members is reached.
4. Relationship between dimension and codimension
4.1. A minimum (co)dimensional class of simple games
A subset C  S is dimensionally minimal if it has C-dimension for all W ∈ S, but
for all B  C there exists a W ∈ S without B-dimension. Analogously, a subset
C  S is codimensionally minimal if it has C-codimension for all W ∈ S, but for all
B  C there exists a W ∈ S without B-codimension.
A subset C  S is dimensionally minimum if it is dimensionally minimal and
C ⊆ D for all set D being dimensionally minimal. Analogously, a subset C  S is
codimensionally minimum if it is codimensionally minimal and C ⊆ D for all set D
being codimensionally minimal.
It is an important issue to determine whether there exists a set of games C being
(co)dimensionally minimum because C would be the most reduced class of simple
games with (co)dimension. In this section we are concerned about the existence of
a minimum (co)dimensional class of simple games.
4.2. Dimension vs.Codimension
The following lemma is an easy consequence obtained from observing relations be-
tween previous deﬁnitions.
Lemma 1. Let B  C  S and let W ∈ S which has a ﬁnite B-dimension (B-
codimension). Then:
(i) W has a ﬁnite C-dimension (C-codimension), and
(ii) dimC(W ) ≤ dimB(W ) (codimC(W ) ≤ codimB(W )).
Proof. (i) If W = W1 ∩ · · ·∩Wk (W = W1 ∪ · · · ∪Wk) with all Wi ∈ B. Then B  C
implies W = W1 ∩ · · · ∩Wk (W = W1 ∪ · · · ∪Wk) where all Wi ∈ C.
(ii) From (i) it directly follows that dimC(W ) ≤ k (codimC(W ) ≤ k) if dimB(W ) =
k (codimC(W ) = k).
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Let C∗ be the subset of simple games on N such that W ∈ C∗ iﬀ W ∗ ∈ C, i.e.
C∗ is the dual of C.
Theorem 3. Let C ⊆ S and let C∗ be its dual. Let W ∈ S. Then:
(i) W has a ﬁnite C-dimension iﬀ W ∗ has a ﬁnite C∗-codimension, and
(ii) codimC∗(W ∗) = dimC(W ) if W has a ﬁnite C-dimension.
Proof of the theorem can be found in (Freixas and Marciniak, 2009).
Here we concentrate on the important consequences of these results:
Remark 1. (i) The games appearing in the proof of Theorem 1 are unitary. Hence,
it follows that each simple game has a ﬁnite U1-dimension. Moreover, all these
notions of dimension are bounded above by the number of maximal losing coali-
tions.
(ii) Analogously, taking the game considered in the proof of Theorem 2 and apply-
ing Theorem 3 it follows that each simple game has a ﬁnite U2-codimension.
Moreover, if we apply de Morgan’s laws (1) to the unitary game W considered
in the proof of Theorem 1 we obtain that
W ∗ = US1 ∪ · · · ∪ USk
where every US is the unanimity game of coalition S, which is weighted and
admits the representation [w;w1, . . . , wn] where
wi =
{
1, if i ∈ S
0, otherwise.
Hence, the U2-codimension is bounded above by the number of minimal winning
coalitions and by Lemma 1 it also has H2-codimension, M-codimension or L-
codimension. Moreover, all these notions of codimension are bounded by the
number of minimal winning coalitions.
(iii) Taking the game considered in the proof of Theorem 2 and applying Theorem 3
we obtain that for every m ≥ 1 there is a game of codimension m. By applying
Morgan’s laws to the game in the proof of Theorem 2 it may be deduced that
if M = {1, . . . , 2m} and W be the collection of sets deﬁned by the minimal
winning coalitions {1, 2}, {3, 4}, . . . , {2m− 1, 2m}, then W is the union of the
m unanimity games. Let Wi be the game that gives weight 1 to each people in
{2i− 1, 2i} and gives weight zero to everyone else. For each of these games, let
the quota q be 2. Notice that S ∈W iﬀ {2i−1, 2i} ⊆ S for some i iﬀ wi(S) ≥ 2
for some i iﬀ S ∈Wi for some i iﬀ S ∈
m⋃
i=1
Wi.
(iv) Theorem 4.3 in (Freixas and Puente, 2008) shows the existence of complete
games, i.e. W ∈ L with M-dimension m for every m ≥ 1. By considering the
dual games of these complete games we obtain complete games of every codimen-
sion m. Further, Theorem 1.7.5 in (Taylor and Zwicker, 1999) and also Theorem
2.1 in (Freixas and Puente, 2001) show games with exponential M-dimension
(or simply, dimension). From Remark 1-(i) these games have U1-dimension and
by Lemma 1-(ii) dimM(W ) ≤ dimU1(W ), for all W ∈ S. Hence, those games
have exponential U1-dimension. Taking the dual games of those games we get
games with exponential U2-codimension.
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(v) If we desire to compute a power index of a simple game that satisﬁes the transfer
axiom and the game has a large number of players, a large M-dimension but
a reduced M-codimension. Then we can compute the power index by using
generating functions (see e.g. (Brams and Aﬀuso, 1976)) and applying them to
each game appearing in the decomposition obtained by applying the union–
exclusion principle to an eﬃcient union of weighted games.
The next result allows computing the U1-dimension and the U2-codimension of
every simple game.
Theorem 4. (i) The U1-dimension of a simple game is the number of maximal
losing coalitions.
(iii) The U2-codimension of a simple game is the number of minimal winning coali-
tions.
Proof of the theorem can be found in (Freixas and Marciniak, 2009). Here we
present a corollary following from this result:
Theorem 4 together with Sperner’s theorem on independent families of subsets
of a given ﬁnite set allows providing upper bounds for the U1-dimension and U2-
dimension of a given simple game.
Corollary 1. Both U1-dimension and U2-codimension for a simple game W with
n players have upper bounds:
dimU1W ≤
(
n
n2 
)
codimU2W ≤
(
n
n2 
)
In the case n even there is a unique such game, which is the (n2 +1)–out–of–n game
for the dimension and its dual game, i.e. the n2 –out–of–n game for the codimension.
If n is odd there are two such games which are: the (n2 +1)–out–of–n game and the
(n2  + 2)–out–of–n game for the dimension, and their dual games, the (n2  + 1)–
out–of–n game (it is autodual) and n2 –out–of–n game for the codimension.
If a simple game is given by either the set of winning coalitions or the set of
losing coalitions, then obtaining the set of minimal winning coalitions or the set of
maximal losing coalitions requires polynomial time. Hence, the U1-dimension or the
U2-codimension of a simple game can be computed in polynomial time whenever the
game is deﬁned by either the set of winning coalitions or the set of losing coalitions.
Instead, if the game is deﬁned by the set of minimal winning coalitions then it
is required exponential time to get the maximal losing coalitions, and therefore
computing the U1-dimension requires exponential time. Analogously, if the game is
deﬁned by the set of maximal losing coalitions then it is required exponential time
to get the minimal winning coalitions, and therefore computing the U2-codimension
requires exponential time. See (Freixas et.al.,2008) for details on these results.
We conclude this section by giving a practical interpretation of the codimension
of the game. Codimension with respect to the class of unanimity games is equal to
the number of chambers, i.e. the number of minimal winning coalitions, thus it can
be seen as the number of possible strategies to win in this game, i.e. the number
of choices that an outsider can regard the game to force win. Let us consider a
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Parliament and a businessman, who wants to change a law in some way, then the
U2-codimension shows how many essential choices has the law to be passed. In fact,
the main objectives for the businessman to exert a great deal of inﬂuence are the
minimal winning coalitions, which are diﬀerent alternatives to pass the law.
5. Minimum (co)dimension
Here we point out the classes which are the minimum dimensionally and respectively
minimum codimensionally classes for simple games. They exist and moreover they
are unique.
Theorem 5. (i) The class, U1, of unitary games is dimensionally minimum.
(ii) The class, U2, of unanimity games is codimensionally minimum.
Proof of the theorem can be found in (Freixas and Marciniak, 2009).
The uniqueness of this class is shown in a following theorem.
Theorem 6. The set of all the unitary games or equivalently those which have
exactly one maximal losing coalition is the smallest set of games, with respect to
which every game has dimension.
Proof. We already know, from the previous theorem that it is a minimal one. Every
set of games for which the dimension of any games is ﬁnite has to contain all the
unitary games. Thus in fact the set of unitary games is the smallest one among the
sets of games, with respect to which the dimension of any simple game exists.
Corollary 2. From the above results the dual statement can be obtained: the set
of all games with exactly one minimal winning coalition (unanimity games) is the
smallest set of games, with respect to which the codimension of any game exists.
Proof. Let T be a class of games for which the codimT is ﬁnite for any simple game,
then T ∗ has the property that dimT∗ is ﬁnite for any game, thus T ∗ contains the
class of unitary games, so T must contain dual of unitary games.
It is important to note the signiﬁcant role played by unanimity games in the
axiomatizations of several power indices. Indeed, Theorem 5-(ii) conﬁrms U2 to be
the minimum class for which simple games can be expressed as union of its elements.
The decomposition of a game as a union of unanimity games has been used in
some proofs for the most well–known power indices, among them, Shapley–Shubik,
Banzhaf, Johnston, Deegan–Packel, Holler.
5.1. Some properties of unitary and unanimity games
We ﬁnally provide a coalitional property to test whether a given game is unitary
and do the same for unanimity games.
Let us consider two classes of simple games. A simple game W is primitive iﬀ
S ∈ W and S = S1 ∪ S2 then S1 or S2 belongs to W . A simple game W is smooth
iﬀ for all S, T ∈W implies S ∩ T ∈W .
Proposition 1. (i) A simple game is unitary if and only if it is primitive.
(ii) A simple game is unanimous if and only if it is smooth.
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Proof. (i) (⇒) Assume that W is unitary, i.e. Wm is uniquely formed by singletons
(the winners of the game). Let S ∈ W and S = S1 ∪ S2. S ∈ W implies that
i ∈ S for a winner i, therefore either i ∈ S1 or i ∈ S2, and thus either S1 ∈ W
or S2 ∈W which implies primitiveness.
(⇐) Assume that W is primitive but not unitary. Then there is a coalition S
in Wm containing at least two players. Let S1  S and S2  S a partition of
S, i.e. S1 ∪ S2 = S and S1 ∩ S2 = ∅. As S1 and S2 are losing coalitions we have
a contradiction with the hypothesis of primitiveness for the game.
(ii) (⇒) Assume that W is unanimous, i.e Wm is formed by a single coalition R. Let
S and T be two arbitrary winning coalitions, then there are minimal winning
coalitions R1 and R2 such that R1 ⊆ S and R2 ⊆ T . As R is the unique element
in Wm it yields R1 = R2 = R and, hence R ⊆ S ∩ T which implies that
S ∩ T ∈ W and so the game is smooth.
(⇐) Assume that W is smooth but not unanimous. Then Wm contains at least
two minimal winning coalitions S and T with S ∩ T  S, S ∩ T  T . Hence,
S ∩ T /∈ W which is a contradiction with the assumption of smoothness.
6. Computational aspects of dimension and codimension
Unanimity games have a natural description – these are the games with unique
minimal winning coalitions. Dually the unitary games are precisely those which
has unique maximal losing coalition. The unanimity game which minimal winning
coalition is A will be denoted as A and the unitary game which maximal losing
coalition is A we will denote by A.
Lemma 2. Let A ⊆ N . Then
dimU1A = |A|, codimU2A = |N\A|
where U1 is the class of unitary games and U2 is the class of unanimity games.
Proof. For the dimension of A it is enough to see that
A =
⋂
a∈A
N\{a} (2)
A coalition W of the game A is winning if and only if A ⊆W . W is winning in the
game N\{a} if and only if W  N\{a}. So W is a winning coalition of the game⋂
a∈AN\{a} if and only if ∀a∈AW  N\{a}, which holds if and only if A ⊆ W .
Thus the equality (2) holds. Moreover, none of the games N\{a} for a ∈ A can
be omitted. It follows that dimU1A = |A|. Using this result and Theorem 3 we
obtain that codimU2A = |N\A|. One just have to observe that A = N\A∗.
Proposition 2. Let G be a game such that codimU2G = k. Let {A1, . . . , Ak} be
the set of all minimal winning coalitions of G (G = A1 ∩ A2 ∩ · · · ∩ Ak). Let
A be a subset of the set of players. Then
A is admissible if and only if ∀m∈{1,...,k}∃!a∈A a ∈ Am (3)
We claim that there is a 1-1 correspondence between admissible subsets and maximal
loosing coalitions of the game G given by {x1, x2, . . . } → N\{x1, x2, . . . }. Thus G
can be expressed as
G =
⋂
A⊆N :A-admissible
N\A (4)
78 Josep Freixas and Dorota Marciniak
Proof. All admissible subsets can be constructed in the following manner:
We choose a sequence of players with respect to the conditions:
x1 ∈ A1 ∪ · · · ∪Ak (5)
x2 ∈
k⋃
i=1
Ai\
( ⋃
i:x1∈Ai
Ai
)
x3 ∈
k⋃
i=1
Ai\
( ⋃
i:x1∈Ai
Ai ∪
⋃
i:x2∈Ai
Ai
)
...
xl ∈
k⋃
i=1
Ai\
⎛⎝ ⋃
i:x1∈Ai∨x2∈Ai∨···∨xl−1∈Ai
Ai
⎞⎠ .
...
The sequence (x1, x2, . . . ) has at most k elements. Then the set {x1, x2, . . . }
is an admissible subset.
One can easily see that if A is admissible then any sequence made of its element
satisﬁes the conditions (5). Let us ﬁx an admissible subset A = {x1, x2, . . . , xl}.
Then the coalition N\A is loosing. A coalition of G is loosing if and only if it
doesn’t contain any of the sets A1, A2, . . . , Ak. By the construction for eachAm,m =
1, . . . , k there exists corresponding xim for some im ∈ {1, 2, . . . , l} such that xim ∈
Am and thus N\A do not contain Am as m was arbitrary N\A is a loosing coalition.
Now let us show that N\A is a maximal loosing coalition. It is so, because for
each set Am,m = 1, . . . , l there exists exactly one element of A which belongs to
Am.
Clearly, if L is a maximal loosing coalition then N\L posses the above property
and thus it is deﬁned by an admissible subset. The equation (4) follows from the
fact that every game G is equal to the intersection of unitary games whose unique
maximal loosing coalition is a maximal loosing coalition of G.
Corollary 3. Let G be a game such that codimU2G = k then its U1 dimension is
equal to the number of admissible subsets of players and for small k it is given by
the formulas:
k = 1 dimU1G = |A1|
k = 2 dimU1G = |A1 ∩A2|+ |A1\A2| · |A2\A2|
k = 3
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
dimU1G = |A1 ∩A2 ∩A3|+ |A1 ∩A2\A3| · |A3\ (A1 ∪A2) |
+ |A1 ∩A3\A2| · |A2\ (A1 ∪A3) |
+ |A2 ∩A3\A1| · |A1\ (A2 ∪A3) |
+ |A1\ (A2 ∪A3) |
+ |A2\ (A1 ∪A3) |
+ |A3\ (A1 ∪A2) |
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Proof. We already know that U2-codimension of a game is equal to the number of
maximal loosing coalitions. It remains to show the formulas, for k = 1 we did it in
lemma 2. For the case k = 2 and k = 3 it is straightforward using the characterisa-
tion of admissible subsets given in (3).
Corollary 4. Let G be a game of U1-dimension equal to k, and let A1, . . . , Ak
denote the maximal loosing coalitions of G, i.e. G =
⋂k
i=1Ai. Then the dual
game G∗ has U2-codimension equal to k. All its minimal winning coalitions are
N\A1, . . . , N\Ak.
codimU2G = dimU1G
∗ = dimU1
k⋃
i=1
N\Ai
And the above theorem provides a direct formula for the U2-codimension of a game
of a given U1-dimension. To obtain the formulas like in the preceding corollary one
just have to replace each Ai by its complement. Thus in particular admissible subsets
of G∗, or equivalently minimal winning coalitions of G, in this setting are the one
with respect to the condition:
A is admissible if and only if ∀m∈{1,...,k}∃!a∈A a /∈ Am (6)
Example 1. Let G be a game with three players {1, 2, 3}. Let the maximal loosing
coalitions be A1 = {1} and A2 = {2, 3}. Then all its minimal winning coalitions are
{{1, 3}, {1, 2}} and thus its U2-codimension is 2. It is easy to check that the given
formula for the U2-codimension gives the same result: A1 ∩ A2 = ∅ and thus the
formula reduces to dimU1G = |A1| · |A2| = 2. The admissible subsets of players are
{2, 3} and {1}. In this example they are the same as maximal loosing coalitions,
this is just because this game has the property that a coalition is a maximal loosing
coalition if its complement is a maximal loosing coalition.
7. Conclusions
The notions of dimension and codimension introduced in this paper extend the clas-
sical notion of dimension for simple games. The paper proposes several subclasses of
simple games with associated dimension or codimension. The most relevant result
is the existence of a smallest subclass of games with dimension and the existence of
a smallest subclass of games with codimension. For these smallest classes we found
a closed formula to compute the dimension or codimension of a given simple game.
There is an analogy between dimension or codimension and basis of vector
spaces. In fact, a basis of a vector space is a maximal collection of linearly in-
dependent vectors. A class of simple games is a ‘basis’ with the intersection as a
basic operation iﬀ each game has dimension for this class and it is a maximal class
of games in which none of them is intersection of some other members of the fam-
ily (maximal independent set of games). We have proved that the class of unitary
games is a ‘basis’ (Theorem 5-(i)) and its constructive proof shows that the space
of all simple games with the intersection as operation has only one basis. An anal-
ogous reasoning follows for the class of unitary games with the union as operation.
Analogously, a class of simple games is a ‘basis’ with the union as a basic operation
iﬀ each game has codimension with for this class and it is a maximal class of games
in which none of them is union of some other members of the family (maximal
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independent set of games). We have proved that the class of unanimity games is a
‘basis’ (Theorem 5-(ii)) and its constructive proof shows that the space of all simple
games with the union as operation has only one basis.
Some hints for future research concern, for example, the classes of homoge-
neous games, complete (or linear) games or weakly linear games (introduced in
(Carreras and Freixas, 2008)). It becomes of interest to study whether there exist
a sequence of weighted games Gm with H1-dimension equal to m for all positive
integer m, and further, whether there exist a sequence of weighted games Gm with
exponential H1-dimension. It becomes of interest to investigate whether there exist
sequences of simple games Gm with L-dimension equal to m for all positive integer
m, and further, whether there exist sequences of simple games Gm with exponential
L-dimension. If the answers to the previous questions for complete games are aﬃr-
mative then we could think of similar questions for weakly linear games instead of
complete games. More general, which properties need to fulﬁll a proper subclass of
simple games, namely C, in such a way that the C-dimension of every simple game
is bounded above. Analogous questions may be asked for codimension.
It also deserves attention to extend the notions of dimension and codimension to
voting games with abstention see e.g. (Fishburn, 1973), (Rubenstein, 1980), (Felsen-
thal and Machover, 1997), (Tchantcho, et. al. 2008). Indeed, a general notion of
weighted voting system for voting systems with several alternatives in the input
and output has been developed in (Freixas and Zwicker, 2003).
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